Find my SSRN page here
Published/accepted articles:
"Storming the Gatekeepers: Digital Disintermediation in the Market for Books" with Joel Waldfogel
(Information Economics and Policy, 2015) [link]
"Can Private Copyright Protection be Effective? Evidence from Book Publishing"
(Journal of Law and Economics, 2016) [paper] (Publishers Weekly article)
"Throwing the Books at Them: Amazon's Puzzling Long-Run Pricing Strategy" with Joel Waldfogel
(Southern Economic Journal, 2017) [paper]
"Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence from the NHL" with Gregory DeAngelo and Adam Nowak
(Contemporary Economic Policy, 2017) [paper]
"Are Public and Private Enforcement Complements or Substitutes? Evidence from High Frequency Data" with Gregory DeAngelo and Brad Humphreys
(Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2017) [paper] (Sports Illustrated article)
"Do Coupons Expand or Cannibalize Revenue? Evidence from an e-Market" with Claire (Chunying) Xie
(Management Science, 2018) [paper]
Working papers:
"Copyright and Generic Entry in Book Publishing" [paper] (revision requested)
Copyright affects the distribution of creative content. Taking works off copyright promotes their availability, which benefits consumers. But it also allows generic entry to dissipate producer surplus. This paper quantifies the effect of the most recent copyright extension -- the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act -- on the availability and price of, and the demand for works that were affected by such an extension. I evaluate the welfare impact of this copyright extension by estimating differences in consumer and producer surplus across a range of works between the copyright regimes. I find that a copyright significantly limits the availability of works, leading to decreases in consumer surplus which are more than four times as large as any increases in profits to copyright holders. Without changing incentives to create, the copyright extension was economically inefficient.
"Digital Disintermediation and Efficiency in the Market for Ideas" (with Christian Peukert) [paper]
Digital technology has allowed inventors to circumvent traditional intermediaries and directly reach consumers, which may affect licensing outcomes and efficiency in the market for ideas. We study these impacts theoretically and empirically in the book publishing industry, where the number of new books available to consumers has almost doubled after the advent of digital self-publishing platforms. Using data on over 90,000 license deals between authors and publishers from 2002 to 2015, we identify disintermediation-related changes in this market from quasi-experimental variation across product types over time. Consistent with digital self-publishing improving an author's bargaining position, we find that authors get substantially more favorable license deals. We further show that ex-ante license fees reflect ex-post demand more accurately. This is consistent with additional entry generating more information about a product type's realized appeal. In markets in which product appeal is difficult to predict, such improvements in the information environment can have large impacts on efficiency and welfare.
"Proprietary Data, Competition, and Consumer Effort: An Application to Telematics in Auto Insurance" (with Benjamin Shiller) [paper]
Firms collecting proprietary consumer information may achieve supernormal profits by targeting profitable consumers or encouraging low-cost behavior. But the competitive advantage lasts only if competitors cannot easily collect similar information. Focusing on auto insurance programs offering discounts to monitored consumers driving safely, we relate proprietary data collection to incumbent profits. We find incumbents’ initial profits are eroded by competition, consistent with costs of monitoring being low, both for the firm and the monitored consumer. We further find monitoring programs reduce fatal accidents, consistent with an alleviation of moral hazard. Thus, regulation incentivizing permanent monitoring may improve welfare.
Here is a link to data sources on the economics of digitization.
Published/accepted articles:
"Storming the Gatekeepers: Digital Disintermediation in the Market for Books" with Joel Waldfogel
(Information Economics and Policy, 2015) [link]
"Can Private Copyright Protection be Effective? Evidence from Book Publishing"
(Journal of Law and Economics, 2016) [paper] (Publishers Weekly article)
"Throwing the Books at Them: Amazon's Puzzling Long-Run Pricing Strategy" with Joel Waldfogel
(Southern Economic Journal, 2017) [paper]
"Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence from the NHL" with Gregory DeAngelo and Adam Nowak
(Contemporary Economic Policy, 2017) [paper]
"Are Public and Private Enforcement Complements or Substitutes? Evidence from High Frequency Data" with Gregory DeAngelo and Brad Humphreys
(Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2017) [paper] (Sports Illustrated article)
"Do Coupons Expand or Cannibalize Revenue? Evidence from an e-Market" with Claire (Chunying) Xie
(Management Science, 2018) [paper]
Working papers:
"Copyright and Generic Entry in Book Publishing" [paper] (revision requested)
Copyright affects the distribution of creative content. Taking works off copyright promotes their availability, which benefits consumers. But it also allows generic entry to dissipate producer surplus. This paper quantifies the effect of the most recent copyright extension -- the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act -- on the availability and price of, and the demand for works that were affected by such an extension. I evaluate the welfare impact of this copyright extension by estimating differences in consumer and producer surplus across a range of works between the copyright regimes. I find that a copyright significantly limits the availability of works, leading to decreases in consumer surplus which are more than four times as large as any increases in profits to copyright holders. Without changing incentives to create, the copyright extension was economically inefficient.
"Digital Disintermediation and Efficiency in the Market for Ideas" (with Christian Peukert) [paper]
Digital technology has allowed inventors to circumvent traditional intermediaries and directly reach consumers, which may affect licensing outcomes and efficiency in the market for ideas. We study these impacts theoretically and empirically in the book publishing industry, where the number of new books available to consumers has almost doubled after the advent of digital self-publishing platforms. Using data on over 90,000 license deals between authors and publishers from 2002 to 2015, we identify disintermediation-related changes in this market from quasi-experimental variation across product types over time. Consistent with digital self-publishing improving an author's bargaining position, we find that authors get substantially more favorable license deals. We further show that ex-ante license fees reflect ex-post demand more accurately. This is consistent with additional entry generating more information about a product type's realized appeal. In markets in which product appeal is difficult to predict, such improvements in the information environment can have large impacts on efficiency and welfare.
"Proprietary Data, Competition, and Consumer Effort: An Application to Telematics in Auto Insurance" (with Benjamin Shiller) [paper]
Firms collecting proprietary consumer information may achieve supernormal profits by targeting profitable consumers or encouraging low-cost behavior. But the competitive advantage lasts only if competitors cannot easily collect similar information. Focusing on auto insurance programs offering discounts to monitored consumers driving safely, we relate proprietary data collection to incumbent profits. We find incumbents’ initial profits are eroded by competition, consistent with costs of monitoring being low, both for the firm and the monitored consumer. We further find monitoring programs reduce fatal accidents, consistent with an alleviation of moral hazard. Thus, regulation incentivizing permanent monitoring may improve welfare.
Here is a link to data sources on the economics of digitization.